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Special economic zones following the enormous success of China have been widely 
imitated. But it is to be entirely anticipated  that the results would vary greatly.  Earlier 
avatars of SEZs in the form of Foreign Trade Zones (FTZs) and Export Promotion Zones 
(EPZs) were important in the export led growth of east Asia especially South Korea. But 
more than SEZs or EPZs per se it is the pursuit of “export led growth policies” which 
underlie the success of exporting and hence of SEZs. SEZz  / EPZs can be seen as a (not 
necessary) microeconomic and spatial initiative in the  pursuit of ELG under rather 
special circumstances by China, and South Korea and  Taiwan to more limited extent in 
their early phases of transformation. In other countries not pursuing ELG the success of 
SEZs/EPZs has been rather modest. The roles played by the SEZs/ EPZs etc whatever 
their original purpose were constrained and determined by the macroeconomic policies, 
trade policies, and regional alignments. There is little meaning in studying SEZs beyond 
their layout and design without reference to these broader trade and macroeconomic 
policies. Thus early pioneers line India could make little out of their EPZs since the 
policies severely biased against exports. We characterise export led growth (ELG) as the 
strategy that has allowed the late twentieth century industrialisations, which is far from 
both import substitution (as conventionally understood) and laissez faire, and to be the 
simultaneous pursuit of both IS and EP. With this framework we are able to understand 
the role and evolution of SEZs in a wide variety of countries. These help us to explain and 
anticipate that unless the policy turns sharply to favours exports (more correctly 
tradables over non tradables) the success of Indian SEZs would be modest and nowhere 
near that registered in China. Following from our characterisation of Import 
Substitution, Export Led Growth and Laissez Faire we also bring out the nature and 
performance of “special zones” when these are promoted under the very same regimes. 
 
                                                 
1 Based on the report of a study  sponsored by the UK High Commission in India. The author is grateful for 
the support provided. The author particularly thanks Mss. Dharti Daftary, Stuti Jha and Nicola Murray of 
the UK High Commission for their support and confidence. This paper is one of the three papers on SEZs in 
India. All views here are those of the author and not of either the UK High Commission or the Indian 
Institute of Management Ahmedabad. The term SEZ is used to cover all particular area or zone based 
development especially of exports and includes export promotion zones (EPZs), Free trade zones (FTZs) 
and such other zones. 




Page No. 2  W.P.  No.  2007-09-02 
   IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
 
Role of Trade and Macroeconomic Policies in the Performance of 





Following especially the remarkable success of China in the use of SEZs to promote 
exports and attract apparently vast amounts of FDI, there is much hope that other 
countries could do as much. Since SEZs are more visible and concrete evidences of the 
actions of the Chinese state to foster the rapid and sustained transformation of the 
economy, they more than the intangibles – the nuances and details of the policies and 
measures that constitute export orientation - have been imitated widely. Results though 
have been high variable. We claim that the core reason for the success of China and East 
Asia lie in the macroeconomic policies and strategies for –viz its pursuit of export led 
growth (ELG) that these countries adopted. Indeed ELG with or without zones would be 
just as effective for countries like India.  Unfortunately the false notion that ELG is 
nothing other than laissez faire has held back the correct macro economic policies from 
being pursued.  The characterisation of ELG is carried out in Section 1 and aspects of 
ELG in relation to both import substitution (IS) and laissez faire (LF) brought out in table 
1. This section although not part of the discussion on SEZs, is important since it lays out 
the correct characterisation  of ELG as essentially different from both laissez faire and 
import substitution (IS). Since this understanding has not yet  found recognition in the 
literature  we bring out the same in some detail based on our earlier work. 
 
This is followed by a consideration of SEZs in a variety of countries relating the 
experience to the overall development strategies that these countries followed. This is 
carried out in Section 2. In Section 3 the Chinese case is brought out with  some of the 
more significant contrasts with the India. In Section 4 the phases in Chinese SEZs along 
with some reference to its transformation  is discussed. In Section 5 very briefly the 
experiences of Philippines,  Russia and Sri Lanka are brought out. In Section 6 (table 4) 
the influences on SEZs arising out of the strategy of economic transformation and growth 
pursued are brought out. The issues arising out the size, location, infrastructure, access to 
central places, fiscal incentives, in the design of SEZs are related directly to the policies 
for SEZs. These are covered in Pandey, Ajay (2006). 
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SECTION 1 : 
EXPORT LED GROWTH, IMPORT SUBSITUTION AND LAISSEZ FAIRE 
 
The remarkable success of East Asian transformations (South Korea, Taiwan, HK, 
Singapore and now China, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia) has attracted the attention of 
governments, development scholars, policy makers, politicians and global developmental 
agencies.  It is well accepted that the stupendous rise in the manufactured exports from 
these countries underlay their success, although the exact content of the policy or policies 
that may be called “Export led growth”, is even now incorrectly understood. 
Governments have attempted to imitate the East Asian countries and in this attempt the 
more visible parts of the strategy – export subsidies and the setting up special especially 
of export zones - have naturally had many followers. But outside the region success has 
been elusive and there is no single country in either Latin America or Africa that can 
show the same success. The case of Latin American countries which despite all the 
endowments necessary for growing all the way to being advanced capitalist countries is 
the most remarkable contrast.
3 The recognition that barring the East Asian there have 
been no really independent transformations
4 in the second half of the 20
th century would 
give added weight to the importance of the East Asian industrialisation and to its correct 
understanding. In reality much of the success arose out of the pursuit of policies that 
would either be considered as impossible by many economists or would be in 
contradiction with their prescriptions. (See discussion in Section 1).   
 
The contrast is especially stark with regard to the  usual prescriptions of the multilateral 
organisations especially the IMF and the WB, through the latter has been quick to 
appropriate the success of East Asia to a vindication of its prescriptions for laissez faire 
trade. (Cf. Little, I.M. D., 1981; Page, 1994; World Bank, 1993). But East Asian approach 
while in many ways have varied the underlying core of the strategy, despite this variety 
can be effectively characterised. The strategy has to be  understood as a whole and 
references to particular elements in isolation has lead to either disbelief or to incorrect 
understanding. (Alam,1989; S. Morris, S., 1997, 2005) 
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3 The continuation of the Latin American countries as middle income over much of the twentieth century 
needs explanation. None of the mainstream stories are really explanations. High inflation leading capital 
flight is often blamed as if inflation is an exogenous aspect. The only possible explanation is that these 
countries in having open capital accounts and the class basis for capital flight they lose much of their 
investible resources.  Thus years of growth are typically followed by years of decline with the global capital 
movements amplifying the cycles and on a net basis leading capital flight. The fact that the elite among 
these societies have their interest in Europe and America implies that policies are geared to allow the 
accumulation of financial savings and their spending in the metropole  countries, to support which vast 
capital flight becomes necessary. Capital flight is made possible by interalia by exchange rates that are 
maintained during periods of flight, followed by large depreciation/ devaluations, to leave post exit high 
inflation as the only way of adjustment. The structural underpinnings of Latin America’s delayed industrial 
growth from the very beginning of the rise of capitalism and under import substitution (See for instance 
Frank, A. G. (1975); Pastor-Jr, M. (1990) and Furtado, Celso (1963); Petras, J. and H. Brill (1988); Baer, 
W. and K. Hargis (1997).) and the de-nationalisation of many of their economies have been brought out by 
the underdevelopment school and its variants. (Evans, Peter B. (1979); Altman, E. I. and I. Walter (1980). 
Thus, during much of industrial growth in Brazil in the post World War II period, policies were severely  
biased against exports. Cf. Tyler, et al. (1985). 
 
4 The transformations of countries such a Portugal and Ireland are on the back of their membership/ easy 
access to the markets of already transformed Western Europe. 
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In another paper (Morris, S., 1997) we have explained ELG as the simultaneous pursuit of 
export promotion and import substitution which to most economists brought upon  the 
standard 2X2X2 model of trade, would seem like impossibility. We have shown that with 
the introduction of a non-traded sector it is conceptually possible for both export 
promotion and import substitution to take place. We  also argue that the observation that 
the ratio of Pm/Px  (Price of exportables to importables) being close to the border ratio 
does not mean that these (ELG) economies were following laissez faire as John Page 
(1994) of the World Bank presumes it to be. It actually means that that in these countries 
the ratio of Px/Pnt and Pm /Pnt  (Pnt –Price of non-tradables) were both much larger than in 
other countries so that there were strong incentives to produce both import goods and to 
export. In doing so the increased production of tradables was demand pulled so that idle/ 
underutilised labour resources could be fully utilised..  
 
Only this could have ensured a 350 times increase in manufactured exports from Korea 
over a 15 year period (1965 to 1980) and about the same increase from China in recent 
times. Thus the gains from trade in ELG (unlike in laissez faire) does not come from 
specialisation per se across countries (which are usually estimated to be of the order of a 
few percent at most in many empirical studies) but from the use of idle / underutilised 
labour in the late industrialising country pursuing ELG. The understanding of the 
structuralists that South Korea and Taiwan, the earliest of the ELG countries had 
significant state intervention demolished the non-intervention thesis of many like Little, 
I.M.D (1981). But that understanding was inadequate to explain why despite the 
intervention (widely admitted and obvious to even casual scholars) ELG countries  even 
South Korea and Taiwan showed Pm/Px   ratios closer to the border prices unlike in the 
case of import substitution economies (most LDCs including India) which showed Pm/Px   
to be much greater than the border prices. The explanation of the strategy developed in 
Morris, S., (1997) and the macroeconomic dimensions of the same in the case of China 
elaborated in Morris, S. (2005) together is the only understanding that can square up with 
the observed facts across the set of ELG countries. One key aspect of ELG is the policy 
induced structural undervaluation of the effective exchange rate. Thus we observe that the 
ratio of exchange rate GDP / Purchasing Power GDP from 1 after removing its systematic 
dependence on country size and level of development of the economy  has in a relative 
sense (relative to all countries) been much less than zero for all ELG countries for which 
reliable data was available (original PPP data from Mark5 World Penn Tables, 
International Comparison Project). For both China and India before 1978 it was greater 
than zero indicating the large overvaluation under traditional import substitution. For 
China after the “open door policy” c.1979 the value goes far below zero and stays at that 
level while the exports grow at rates that exceeded 22% per annum in dollar terms on a 
sustained basis. For India the value since the 80s has been closer to zero implying the 
movement to equilibrium pricing rather to promotion of tradable goods through policy 
induced undervaluation. See Fig.1
5.  
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5 Since this is not a paper in either growth strategies or macroeconomics, the reader is referred to Morris, S. 
(1997) and to Morris, S. (2005) for  discussion of the characterization of ELG as in here and for the use of 
the same framework to understand the case of Indian growth since 1992, and the Chinese over the period 
since the “open-door policies”.  
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 SEZs AND GROWTH STRATEGIES 
 
See tables 2 and 3 which outline the employment in SEZs as put together by the ILO. As 
can be seen the use of SEZs by China and other Asian countries is overwhelming large 
and successful SEZs are a  phenomenon of exporting Asia and to a lesser extent Latin 
America. But with over 7500 zones they have been widely imitated. 
 
Table 2. Estimates of the Development of Export Processing Zones 
 1975   1986  1995   
1997 
 2002
No. of countries with EPZs   25  47  73   93   116
No. of EPZs   79  176  500   845   3 
000
Employment (millions)   n.a  n.a  n.a   22.5   43
– of which China   n.a  n.a  n.a   18   30
– other countries for which figures available   0.8  1.9  n.a.   4.5   13
Total countries for which data were available 
(108) 
        
Source: ILO calculations based on a variety of sources including zone administrations, national 
statistics, web sites, published articles, estimates and responses to ILO surveys, updated to Dec. 
2002; from International Labour Office Gb.286/Esp/3,  286th Session, Governing Body Geneva, 
March 2003, Committee On Employment And Social Policy Esp, Third Item On The Agenda, 





Table 3: Employment in Export Processing Zones Across Regions
Geographical Area Employment Number of 
zones
Asia 36,824,231 749 
- of which China  (30,000,000)  
- of which BGMEA factories in 
Bangladesh 
(2,000,000)  
Central America & Mexico   2,241,821 3300 
Middle East  691,397  37 
North Africa  440, 515 23 
Sub-Saharan Africa  431,348 64 
North America  330,000 713 
South America  311,143 39 
Transition Economies  245,619 90 
Caribbean 226,130 87 
Indian Ocean  127,509 3 
Europe 50,830 55 
Pacific 13,590 14 
Total 41,934,133  5,174
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Fig.1 : Deviations of Exchange Rate GDP/PPP GDP 
0.4 
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Special economic zones have been widely imitated from Latin America to Africa but 
export led growth has not followed. Today in India policy after having promoted “Free” 
trade zones, export promotion zones, now attempts to promote special economic zones. 
The fond hope in this effort is that the Indian economy especially its manufacturing sector 
which has been under assault of imports from China would be able to withstand the same 
and perhaps even be able to follow China in exporting to the world. In most of the 
countries that attempted to imitate the East Asian countries their special economic zones 
have played roles quite different from those in East Asia and these roles have been 
determined by the overall macroeconomic policies, state strategy besides geo-politics. 
The internal  design, layout and management of SEZs whatever be the initial plans may 
have tended to veer towards serving the specific role that the SEZ ended up performing, 
within the constraints of overall macroeconomic policies and the strategy of development 
pursued.  
 
FTZs under Bias against Exports 
 
Thus in the Indian case the earlier free trade zones (FTZs) and export promotion zones 
(EPZs) ended up being more custom bond houses with some assembly and 
manufacturing. Growth remained small and the pressures to expand the size of the zones 
were never large. Nor did the expected spillover effects of manufacturing within the zone 
on outside manufacturing materialise. The incentive to set up activity in these zones were 
constrained by the severe basis against  exports right until 1993, the anti-export bias of 
much of Indian policy until 1993. The poor-economic and political relations with the 
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. Thus there are no zones that cater to trade with its neighbours despite the enormous 
potential if one were to go by the experience of Thailand with its neighbours 
(Maneepong, C., 2004) or China and its land neighbours. The units that came up in these 
centres did so more out of the need to overcome  costs (taxes, and custom duties) on such 
operations as assembly and manufacture of electronic parts in India. Thus for example 
until almost 1993, the policy attempted to protect all segments of the electronic industry 
including such scale and R&D intensive industries like DRAMs and chip manufacturing. 
And in the process the policy hurt many industries in electronics typically assembly, the 
cladding of chips, manufacture of PCBs, design of computers and ICs, software, back 
office operations, cross border data related industries, etc which were skill labour 
intensive. All of these had enormous export potential. 
 
Few outside the country are appreciative of the deep biases against exports of Indian post 
independence polices which continued till as late as 1993 and even now cannot be 
supposed to have been entirely overcome
6. In the Mumbai zone (Santa Cruz Export 
Promotion Zone) the freedom of being allowed to import computers and the access to 
white collar workers allowed a modicum of development of the zone largely in software 
and data processing related services. The origin of some of the software giants, and the 
PC manufacturers (once the import of processors and semiconductors were allowed in the 
nineties)  that were to come later, lay in this zone, but the true liberation of the software 
industry from body shopping happened only since the era on large scale data transfer 
capability and data over cable, essentially the late eighties and the nineties. For  much of 
the rest of Indian manufacturing the biases were too severe to allow industries like auto-
ancillaries, non-electrical equipment, and nearly the entire organised industrial sector to 
export despite cost effective production
7. Exports were therefore restricted to ‘absolute” 
advantage industries much of it in the unorganised sector that used cheap and unprotected 
labour –diamond polishing, stone cutting, dirty chemical processing, handloom based 
textiles, ethnic products, products of nature, leather and handicrafts, and at the margin 
some light engineering based on exploitation of labour. Competitive industries could 
export very little in the face of the biases and the domination of world exports by the East 
Asian countries where the policy created strong biases in favour of exports. 
 
Labour Absorption in Zones 
 
When late industrialising countries embark upon their growth process, based on raising 
the investment rate in the economy, the condition that the added production of goods and 
services be cost effective and of a type that has an increasing market, usually imply inter 
alia the use of modern technologies. Unlike the traditional household technologies which 
have little potential to continually raise labour productivity by absorbing capital, modern 
technologies have that potential and hence the sin quo non of the late industrial 
transformation is the adoption of these technologies. But their adoption on a mass scale 
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6 It was Singh, M. (1964), who drew attention to the collapse of exports in India over the late second half of 
the fifties and sixties during which the Mahalanobis Plan was vigorously pursued. Besides textiles where 
India had a share of the world market that exceed 15% which fell to less than 1%, in many other areas – 
handtools and light manufacturing, cycles, pipes etc, India’s share nearly completely collapsed. The tragedy 
is that if there was one country that was ideally situated to take advantage of the falling tariffs under the 
GATT rounds from 1948 until 1973 it was India! 
7 A “suprising” result of a World Bank Study of the non-electrical machinery sector in 1984 covering the 
period of the early eighties was that almost all the industries it studied suffered from negative effective 
protection, and the domestic resource costs (DRCs) indicated that there were very efficient industries. 
World Bank (1989).  
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does add to the problem of surplus labour. And all successful late industrialisers 
overcame that problem by very rapid growth which demands the quick raising of  the 
investment level and its  maintenance at  a high level during the transformation phase. 
The demand side consistency for such a process was ensured both by high agricultural 
growth (nearly always engendered by land reforms in densely populated economies) and, 
as well by allowing external (export) demand to absorb labour directly even if such 
activities had little backward and forward linkages except through the labour income 
effect. The many early SEZs (then EPZs) in Taiwan, South Korea, Philippines, Mexico,  
Thailand, Singapore, China and Hong Kong must be seen as making possible this direct 




Additionally the pursuit of ELG was important to extend the advantage of such  “zonal” 
activities by enhancing the backward and forward linkages and most importantly by 
making possible a steady supply of new industries (often developed in the ‘hot-house’ of 
import substitution a little earlier) for export activities both within zones and outside 
zones. In other words the pursuit of ELG by making possible exports of manufactures in a 
sustained way (not merely by exploiting existing factor cost advantages but dynamic 
comparative advantage) is what made possible the rapid growth (often called 
“miraculous” in the literature) of the zones and their vast spillovers on to the rest of the 
economy, and finally to this integration with the economy.  Thus among the set of 
countries mentioned above while all adopted the policy of using zones to absorb surplus 
labour, those who did not adopt ELG (Hong Kong, Philippines, Mexico) could not grow 
as rapidly, to transform as the others which did (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, China 
from 1978,and Thailand). Hong Kong, in its reintegration back with China as China’s 
open door policies took root, and given the metropolitan status of this city state, was 
nevertheless able to grow and transform .  Its role was to provide capital and softer 
services for China’s early phase of ELG, exploiting its locational and central place, 
governance and historical advantages of having specialised in higher order services. 
 
Indian Growth Strategy 
 
The contrast of these countries with India’s import substitution was nearly total. The 
Indian approach was entirely supply oriented, with demand planned to arise from rising 
investments and from the agricultural sector. The Mahalanobis Plan (Mahalanobis, P.C., 
1963) was doubly handicapped in absorbing labour and in ensuring sustainability of the 
transformation over the longer term. And the reasons for the same are not clearly 
understood even in the academic not to speak of the popular discussions. The most 
critical difference followed from the assumption of a closed economy from which all 
other differences followed. This meant that capital goods required for investment (as the 
rate of investment was to be raised)  had necessarily to be produced locally denying the 
possibility of using the export of light manufactures to  import capital goods. It 
necessarily meant that a rising savings rate had to be expended on a rising capital output 
ratio so that the growth that would be possible at any particular savings rate would be 
much smaller than in import substitution per se. In other words the push into heavy 
industries arising out of the closed economy assumption from the very beginning meant 
slow absorption of labour and slow growth in the initial periods, by design. This in the 
Mahalanobis Plan was sought to be “compensated” by investing  in the household 
industries which it was assumed (based on the factor proportions in this segment) could 
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deliver vast increases in both output and in labour use for small amounts of fixed capital 
invested in the segment. Clearly that there was an ascendant path (that could be 
determined by the planner) of gradual transformation and modernisation of household 
industries was also being assumed  thereby. While a gradual process characterised the 
first and early industrialisations , given the existence of enclaved industries, and more 
generally of a ready shelf of technologies being available in the context of late 
industrialisation  the Mahalanobis assumption was ahistorical and orthogonal (in this 
particular respect) to the late industrialisation process. This is also amply supported by the 
observation of Dennis Anderson (1984) and others (notably Ishikawa (1962)) that the 
household (barring a very tiny segment of the same which are able to change their 
processes or have favourable terms of trade)  segment declines continuously as the 
industrialisation process take root. (Morris, S. 2001a).  
 
The Indian economy went through distinct phases, the first was the phase of Planned 
Development (1955-1965), this was followed by the “phase of re-distribution”  (1965-
1979) wherein the state, given the failure of the plan to overcome unemployment, was 
forced adopt a vast array of de-distributive activities both symbolic and otherwise. But the 
failure of most of these programmes and schemes could have been anticipated. [No state 
has been able to overcome endowments failure of a large part of its population through 
programmes that mimic charity,  but the one-shot redistribution typically in the form of 
land reforms, and investments in education have been eminently successful. Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand are notable successful late industrial examples]. This  
second phase was one of very slow growth (approx. 3.5% per annum) and this was 
followed by a phase more moderate growth (5% per annum) in the eighties and the period 
of some what better growth (5-6%) in the nineties following the reform of 1992-93. 
(Morris, S. 1997, Morris, S. 2002a).  
 
Ant-Export Bias and Early EPZs in India 
 
Given the anti-export bias of the Mahalanobis Plan, its bias against absorbing labour, and 
the non-implementation of land reforms, the potential to absorb labour was very little as 
was amply proved once the Plan came crashing (c.1964). The period from 1965 to 1979 
which was one of slow growth –the so called Hindu Period absorbed labour at a very low 
rate (including in the modern small firms sector) that may not have even kept pace with 
population growth, thereby doing little to the problem of disguised unemployment even 
as late as the early eighties.  Over the same period the use of EPZs to absorb labour in 
processing industries was denied by the overall policy that biased against exports and the 
lack of labour flexibility even in the EPZs. It was only in the eighties that some limited 
labour  flexibility  emerged in Mumbai and surrounding areas, as dysfunctional union 
behaviour began to give way to “economic demands” from labour. Only in the nineties 
can significant change  in labour flexibility  be said to have been realised. Only the  
Santacruz Electronic Export Promotion Zone (SEEPZ) being situated in Mumbai had 
some labour using activities, but the employment it  provided was miniscule, largely 
because the macroeconomic and tax policies were about as biased against exports as 
could have been imagined, and none of these units could have used the vast and low cost 
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Latin America’s EPZs 
 
In Latin American countries particularly in Central America and Mexico the zones 
became essentially ‘maquiladora’ industries that were based on relocation of parts of a 
value added chain of many manufacturing industries in the US that were particularly 
labour intensive or where the high labour safety and work place norms raised the costs of 
manufacture within US. Again these countries lacking the ‘export –led growth policy’ 
and the internal dynamism to carry through the transformation grew far more slowly and 
with wide variation in the rates than EA, and as such their zones did not play the 




In Africa almost all the zones that came up were in response to preferential tariff 
arrangements under the Lome Convention and more generally under the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP), but most importantly the quota hopping behaviour of the 
successful East Asian exporters. Thus as in Mauritius the export zones were populated by 
garment firms from Korea, Taiwan and Thailand and elsewhere trying to get over the 
limitations of their quota under the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) in the rich countries 
especially the US and EU. These could not take root in the deep manner the early “labour 
seeking” investments from the US and Japan in electronic and other labour intensive 
industries could in Taiwan , Korea or Singapore since the complimentary conditions for 
their spread and spill over effects were hardly there.  
 
Principally, these relate to the conditions for growth of the home market and the nature of 
the state and its overall pursuit of policies that cohered little with bringing about industrial 
transformation. Thus in nearly all these countries the economic sizes were too small to 
allow meaningful import substitution and the initial diversification of the economy. In 
others (not necessarily small in size), the effort of  import substitution was weak, 
uncoordinated and suffered  from significant state failure, and were prematurely given up 
often under the tutelage of multi lateral agencies (MLAs). Similarly, the lack of a 
sufficiently robust agricultural transformation due in most cases to lack of public 
investments in agriculture and insufficient protection, limited the scope of the home 
market to provide sufficient impetus to the rudimentary industrial sectors. Even when 
there were regional agreements they were far too feeble to make any difference. Larger 
countries – Nigeria and Congo which had the best prospects were also subject  to the vast 
capital flight which may have been as high as 4-8% of GDP.  (Lensink, R., N. Hermes, et 
al. (1998);  Ndikumana, L. and T. Hall (c2000); Duwendag, D. (1988); Lessard, D. R. and 
J. Williamson (1987)).  
 
Almost all of them had overvalued currencies and export hurting policies so that whatever 
little of the simple manufactured exports that could have taken place did not
8. Lacking 
therefore either  the impetus of the  home market though consolidation of size, 
agricultural growth or public investments or of the external market , industries remained 
enclaved generating rents and transfers than further investments. SEZs therefore could 
hardly have been expected to play any significant role in these economies. In countries 
 
  Page No. 11  W.P.  No.  2007-09-02 
                                                 
8 Natural resource exports and associated FDI to extract the same, whose determinants were of course very 
different could and did take place. But these had hardly any linkages, and with incomes  arising largely in 
the form of rents and profits to foreign capital, the spending multipliesr effects would have been limited to 
wage incomes generated by FDI. 
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that had inherited a certain regional centrality due to the location of cities of higher order 
(Kenya because of Nairobi,  Nigeria because of its many large cities the special zones 
played an additional role in the weakly developing internal division of labour within the 
region /continent. This role was much larger and may have predominated in Latin 
America. FDI among Latin American countries was driven by the need of transnationals 
to optimise their activities across the region as intra-regional tariffs came down and 
regional agreements were forged. (Vaitsos, C. 1978). 
 
Problems of State and Class in Africa 
 
At the core the problems of Africa may be characterised as arising out of the class 
structure that these countries were left with in the post independence period (as for 
instance in Uganda and Kenya) and the essentially limited nature of the responses to 
overcome the same (as for instance in Tanzania). [Leys, Colin (1975), Mamdani, M. 
(1976), Shivji, Issa (1976)]. The countries with rich natural resources in these 
circumstances were subject to political and other kinds of involvement by multinational 
corporations (MNCs) (oil companies in Nigeria, Belgian and other mining interest in 
Congo for example). And when faced with either kleptocratic regimes or corruptible 
regimes, the rents from the mineral wealth could only lead to vast income inequalities, 
often strife, and to capital export. This is in sharp contrast to the nation building process 
and public investments that resulted out of the oil, gas and timber wealth of Malaysia, or 
the rice surplus of Thailand  with their  functional states. At still another level the 
initiatives correcting endowment failure – universalisation of education and skill 
formation through state initiative, and land reforms were not pursued in Africa, so that 
home markets and their growth could play only a limited role. And in many cases 
substantial numbers  of their people were left outside the markets – to leave the problem 
of  systemic poverty, to be ‘addressed’ (ineffectively of course) through micro-action by 
NGOs and charity from richer countries. 
 
Erroneous Policies of MLAs 
 
Compounding these problems was the role of the multilateral agencies (MLAs) . As these 
countries ran into balance of payments problems (arising mostly out of capital flight and 
associated overvalued currencies ) and the attendant inflation, MLA imposed upon them 
orthodox currency depreciations and fiscal tightening. Currency depreciations did not 
work in the many countries whose exports consisted on a few natural resources, since 
their economies were hardly diversified, and even further liberalisation of the capital 
account to feed capital flight ( Cf. Lensink, R., N. Hermes, et al. (1998)).  Fiscal 
tightening especially when they resulted in decline of public investments did not result in 
the rise of private investments. Under a policy that encouraged open capital account or 
turned a blind eye capital flight (arguing that these arose out of the poor macro economic 
policy) not recognising its endemic character surpluses generated in the growth process 
could hardly be fully retained and invested domestically. The dismantling of import 
substitution in almost all these countries was far too hasty. Similarly agricultural 
liberalisation has placed many of these countries with much agricultural potential at the 
mercy of imports (highly subsidised by much of Europe and the rich countries (other than 
the Cairns group possibly)).  In violating the basic tenets of late industrialisation these 
countries do not as yet have a sustained engine of transformation and as such it is little 
wonder than their SEZs have been confined to the role of supplying in a small way to the 
rich countries under preferential arrangements.  
 
  Page No. 12  W.P.  No.  2007-09-02 
   IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
 
SECTION 3:  
SEZs IN CHINA CONTRASTED WITH THE INDIAN CASE 
 
 
In contrast the role of SEZs in China (and earlier in Korea) has been stupendous, with as 
much as 30% of its  exports it is estimated arising from SEZs. SEZs in Korea and Taiwan 
being important earlier now contribute little, since the countries as a whole have turned 
ELG. Being small in size the natural role for the SEZs would be to wither away as the 
salient features of the zones and their  working were embraced by the rest of the 
economy. In China too we should see a decline in the relative role of the SEZs as the 
economy as a whole gets driven by markets and the ELG works to transform the 
economy. But the administrative declaration of many new fast growing areas – Shanghai, 
the interior the Machurian border etc as SEZs masks the decline of zones when 
functionally defined as special and in many ways shielded from the rest of the economy.  
 
Early Export Zones in China 
 
After the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, the Chinese economy whose trade ratio especially on 
account of imports had risen to moderately high levels under the various loan and 
technology transfer agreements, witnessed a fall in the trade ratio. In response to the 
exports having  declined to a near autarkic level of 2.5% of GDP, the Chinese 
government set up several ECPBs (Export Commodity Production Bases) both along the 
coast and the interior, c. 1963. But overall macroeconomic policy had turned deeply 
against the production of export goods specifically during the period of deep import 
substitution. Therefore the lack of success of the ECPBs was only to be expected despite 
the active interest of the state to ensure their success.  (Guangwen, Meng (2003). After 
the mess of the Great Leap Forward 1957 to 1962, the first ECPB was established in 1963 
and several others were set up during the period up to 1978, including the Foshan City 
ECPB near Guangzhou in 1973. “They were granted a higher priority status in or 
preferential access to development capital, transportation, raw materials, electricity, and 
reduction of import duty for export production input accounting to their ability to meet 
contractual obligation”. Guangwen, Meng (2003), Their limited success was nevertheless 
of crucial importance in allowing the Chinese economy to import basic machinery and 
other capital goods from capitalist countries to make possible the import- substitution 
programme, from 1963 to 1978. This period of import substitution had been interrupted 
by the masochistic Cultural Revolution  (1967-72) and the quick recovery from the nadir 
in China’s trade ratio in 1971 (5%), with exports being as low as 2.5%, to between 9 and 
10% in the by the mid seventies were enabled by these ECPBs.  
 
The Chinese import substitution may be seen as having taken place between 1950 and 
1957 and then from 1972 to 1978. Unlike in the Indian case of import substitution from 
1955 to 1965, the importance of exports to finance the importation of capital goods was 
recognised in China, (the retreat into obscurantism during the Cultural Revolution and the 
Great Leap Forward apart). In India it was only during the eighties that earning foreign 
exchange rather than merely saving foreign exchange were seen as being relevant. Thus 
statements of a “unit of foreign exchange saved is worth a unit of foreign exchange 
earned” by planners and economists alike tightened the noose around the economy. And 
the low growth over the late sixties and the early seventies may in part be attributable to 
the lack of foreign exchange for even such small items but of much importance like 
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crucial instrumentation, critical inputs like even grease! Deng Zio Ping was in charge 
during a brief period in 1975. He was nevertheless able to impart his idea of  riding both 
import substitution and export promotion. This was exemplified in the increasing role of 
ECPBs - a prelude to the export led growth strategy since 1978 once Deng was able to 
reassert himself from the end of 1978. 
 
In contrast the early success of India’s important substitution (the Indian economy at the 
close of 1965 was perhaps the most diversified economy outside the developed countries) 
made the through going re-examination of the strategy intellectually and politically 
difficult despite the years of stagnation and low growth that followed from 1965.   
 
Indian and Chinese Import Substitution Contrasted 
 
An important distinction between the Indian import substitution and  the import-
substitutions of all other countries (except perhaps the Soviet Union’s) was the twist 
provided by the Mahalanbobis Plan. Much attention has been drawn to the high tariffs 
and the ‘protectionism’ as also the “licensing raj” and their dysfunctionalities. But 
perhaps more than all these the idea of import substitution and growth under the closed 
economy assumption from which followed the logic of high investment in the k-goods 
sector from the very beginning as determining the ultimate growth of the economy (the so 
called heavy industry bias of the Mahalanobis Plan) was unique.  This analytically 
implied small growth rates in the first ten years increasing thereafter and had no parallel 
with other plan models of transformation. It is this rather than the import substitution per 
se that greatly reduced the growth once the option of rising  investments to create the 
market for capital goods was exhausted and the high costs of making all capital goods in-
house had to be borne. More normal import substitution (without a closed economy 
framework) which was followed by China (except during the excesses of the GLF and 
CR) is not essentially self limiting. In itself such normal import substitution in potentially 
large economies have resulted in the industrial transformation – as exemplified  by the 
US, and Germany in the nineteenth century, and Japan in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 
 
Regional Development Excesses 
 
Regional development excesses marked the Chinese development almost until 1978. The 
Plans in China started with the idea that the interiors of China Proper, should be the target 
of the bulk of the public investments and as much a 67% of the investments may have 
been so regionally directed even before the Sino-Soviet split. Since the split an additional 
reason – to ensure security of investments by locating them away from the borders further 
enhanced the bias towards the interior. This obviously resulted in the net material product 
of the interior increasing even though in the first decade and a half the interlinkages 
between these modern industries and the surrounding economic activities were hardly 
there. As such these large public investments’ positive role may have served to create an 
enclaved modern sector in the interior. It is quite certain that the coastal areas which were 
the recipients of more than 70% of domestic investments in the pre-plan period c.1949. 
(Guangwen, Meng (2003)) could if built upon by planning and import substitution have 
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Labour Use Differences 
 
A large price would no doubt have been paid in terms of the costs of these measures, 
since the network and agglomeration effects of locating closer to the coast which already 
had more than an enclaved growth had to be denied.  And the large transport costs to 
interlink centres of investment in the interior as also these locations to the coast has to be 
undertaken simultaneously with the investment.  Since even in this period the strategy of 
using idle labour (in a Lewisian sense) through mobilisation was at the core of the 
Chinese effort the real economic cost (not human cost) may not have been large despite 
the excesses arising out of ‘balancing” economic development. On the other hand in India 
the more modest regional development efforts being based on freight equalisation and 
without any explicit administrative strategy to use idle labour would have paid high fiscal 
and economic costs. The Mahalanobis Plan sought to use idle labour through restrictions 
capacities freezes on the large consumption goods sector, and promotion of small firms 
rather than trough mobilisation. This was counter to the industrial evolution of late 
industrial countries and resulted in severe biases against sectors that were most 
competitive, and as such were doomed to result in no more than a diversification of the 
economy.  Furthermore, land reforms were a crucial requirement of the Plan in India 
since it was based on a supply (rather then demand) constraint assumption. Unfortunately, 
while this was realised in the Plan the land reforms as envisaged in the Avadi Congress 
Resolution were not carried out. China in contrast never had to face a home market 
constraint. Since the endowments problem was overcome under the egalitarian of 
common. So was the case with  Japan, Taiwan, and  South Korea all of which carried out 
land reforms (Morris, Sebastian 2001a)) to overcome the agricultural constraint. 
 
Imitating the “Little Dragons” 
 
The period from 1978 onwards up until almost 1990 with its very rapid growth resulting 
from imitating the East Asian Dragons’ trade and macroeconomic policies,  served to 
accentuate the difference between the coastal areas and the interior. This is despite the 
fairly large fiscal transfers and the attempt of the centre to support investments in the 
interior.  Since 1990 the emphasis was on opening up other “growth axis” along the 
Yangtze river going all the way to the great city of Chongking and beyond, the areas 
along the Longhai-Lanxin Railway and border growth areas along the Korean side, the 
ASEAN Side bordering Vietnam and the Western Side bordering the Central Asian 
Countries. Of the latter border areas the developments along the ASEAN and Korea were 
more important given the greater dynamism and ELG policies of the neighbours.  In all 
these new ‘growth-areas’ Special Economic Zones played a major part. Guangwen, Meng 
(2003). Over the nineties in response to these initiatives the differences between the Coast 
and the interior began to slowly decline through there never was very large income 
differences. (Zaing, Jie and Gustav Kristansen (2001)).  The point to note here is that 
SEZs were an important element in the growth process, and in the policies that sought to 
direct and manage the same. In concentrating the growth potential of the interior and the 
border areas into the defined zones, the Chinese strategy was to take advantage of the 
agglomeration and other locational economies, besides the administrative and 
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SECTION 4:  
 PHASES IN CHINA’S SEZs 
 
Concerned scholars of Chinese SEZs have seen many phases in the development of the 
approach to Special Zones. From the development of zones adjacent to cities mid sized 
and small,  in the Pearl River Delta in the very early phase post the Open Door Policy 
(1978) to the phase of high tech and specialised zones that are being promoted today. The 
idea of zones, after the remarkable Pearl River Delta success and the success of ELG 
more generally was extended geographically,  and also resulted in the increased size of 
the zones themselves, extension  from processing zones to cities, to areas encompassing 
export production activities, and to large territories such as Hainan Island itself. They 
have also been extended along easy communication routes –river valleys as along the 
Yangtze and the railway into the central interior (Longhai- Lanxin) and along borders 
which we have already seen.  
 
Pearl River Delta Development 
 
The development of the Pearl River Delta area is a fallout of the one country two systems 
approach of the “open-door” policy that the post Mao regime put in place. (Victor F. S. 
Sit and Chun Yang (1997)). The idea that the fruits of international trade and foreign 
investment could be realised without having to change the essentially state administered 
communist system led to the creation of special areas to which foreign investors could be 
directed. The investments began to take root only in the early eighties and that too only in 
engaging migrant  labour of the skilled and semi skilled variety. The FDI flows largely 
from Hong Kong and Macao based Chinese firms (some of which could have been 
‘benami’ firms controlled by the newly emerging Chinese business elite) became a flood 
to swamp the developments in the region.  While the micro level actions of the state and 
the provincial  –Guangdong governments besides the local municipalities have been 
highlighted in the development of the special zones what is under emphasised in the 
literature is the coherence with the national level policies and the situation in HK and 
Macao. Thus the principal aspect of the opening up in 1978 itself as the massive support 
to exporting as an activity. This was done in the first instance by allowing public 
enterprises to export whatever they could. They could keep part of the exchange earned to 
import goods and sell in the domestic market. This part convertibility on the current 
account allowed the public sector (including the trading firms) to leverage the massive 
import repression to make exports lucrative.   
 
Later any Chinese unit exporting could keep a part of the foreign exchange to use the 
same to import items of great local value. The incentive this provided to Chinese exports 
in relation sales in the domestic market were considerable and the country registered 
export growth in excess of 25% over the next five years. The limitations of this approach 
were being realised even then, since it was obvious that entry into items like textiles and 
garments light engineering and electronics assembly required import liberalisation at least 
in so far as the inputs to these industries were concerned.   
 
In the next phase steep devaluation of the currency, and import liberalisations maintained 
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Continued success of China was dependent upon the  introduction of newer technologies, 
designs and the marketing links all of which were lacking among Chinese firms given the 
centralised and ‘autarkic’ development of the past. Foreign direct investment was seen as 
the basis for the transfer of these competencies and since the bulk of the economy was 
still under centralised planning with limited role for markets, the need for zones within 
which would be limited the capitalistic activities to earn foreign exchange had been 
arrived at, as a political ‘compromise’. The very large and structural devaluations of the 
currency effective for exports in China gave to the process of industrial relocation (and 
then location) of activities from HK and Macao initially and then from Taiwan, Korea 
and Japan the basis for the sustained expansion of manufacturing exports from China at 
rates in excess of 20%. (Sung, Yu-Wing (1991)),   
 
Role of Hong Kong and Macao 
 
It also coincided with the need for Hong Kong and Macao (actually of its Chinese trading 
businesses including the manufacturing enterprises) to venture out to cheaper locations. 
This need was stronger for HK and Macao rather than Korea and Taiwan since the latter 
countries had preceded or accompanied their export led growth with deeper import 
substitution thereby creating a vast array of manufactured goods which could be exported, 
even as their comparative advantage declined in labour intensive goods as incomes rose.   
In other words the policies of these ELG  countries created the basis for unfoldment of 
dynamic comparative advantage
10, which could continue to take through the 
transformation without any interruptions. HK and Macao with laissez faire policies were 
limited largely to their initially given comparative advantage and so the opportunities to 
set up labour intensive manufacturing in Thailand (which had also successfully imitated 
the first generation of ELG countries) was important. The opening of the Pearl River 
Delta area gave the glorious opportunity for HK and Macao firms to continue in labour 
intensive manufacturing especially of textiles garments and electronic assembly. The 
shortness of the distance despite the international border was important as also the revival 
of links with Chinese of a previous generation and the new business elite (largely derived 
from the party leaders) and the Chinese local governments. But perhaps the most 
important of all were the availability of a dedicated non-unionised working class, well 
trained and willing to work on incentives. Wage costs were ridiculously low given the 
extreme undervaluation of the Chinese currency.  An added and necessary factor was the 
ability of the Chinese government both central and local to adhere to their commitments 
in terms of infrastructure, labour supply insulation from local controls, and freedom to 
import. The tax concessions and other fiscal concessions were important. The need for 
HK, Macao and soon enough Taiwanese firms to overcome quotas on their exports to the 
advanced countries given the Multi Fibre Agreement were contributory factors. As 
Chinese locations proved to the very lucrative for such labour seeking foreign 
investments,  a flood of investments followed that went beyond textiles and related items 
to consumer electronics light engineering, and to regions outside the zones, and to areas 
outside the Pearl River Delta. 
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‘FDI’ into the Pearl River Delta Area 
 
The extreme dynamism of the exports from the zones in the Pearl River Delta led to 
“FDI” from HK and Taiwan to small and mid sized towns and cities in the area including 
in the Shenzen zone. This was supported by the rapid infrastructural upgradation of the 
destinations of FDI, allowing a hierarchy of central places that placed HK at the centre, 
displacing Guangzhou the primate city in the region. Victor F. S. Sit and Chun Yang 
(1997). Indeed Guangzhou itself had displaced HK which had been the primate city 
during the long years of close door development from 1950 to 1975, a period during 
which the trade links of HK with China had steadily come down.  Therefore, the FDI 
from HK. Macao and Taiwan,  especially the latter must be seen as the beginning of 
reintegration of the Chinese economy with the world, the reestablishment of the primacy 
of Hong Kong and bringing back (to create) the foundations for markets and the 
competencies for dealing with the rest of the world which had been left to flourish in HK.  
 
Beyond all the situational geographic and political factors, stood the economic. In 
undervaluing its currency and in explicitly supporting exports the reality of Chinese 
labour being available at very low price (its true price owing to ‘Unlimited’ supplies of 
labour in a Lewisian sense) but now to the whole world through exports was the core 
reason for success. And this policy is easily emulated. In that respect China was only 
following the ‘flying geese’ fashion the export led growth economies – Korea, Taiwan 
and Thailand. (Morris, S. 1997, Morris, S., 2005). Its much deeper import substitution 
given its large size and the policy of self reliance under communist government, allowed 
that process to go on from producing garments and textiles to practically every item of 
manufacturing. The massive redistribution of incomes and assets under the communist 
regime, as also the fact that basic health and education had been achieved in a universal 
way,  had created a society with near equality of income distribution and corrected the 
endowment failure. That allowed the home market to expand vigorously based on the 
demands created by the spending out of labour incomes of the massive employment that 
export industries in zones created. Of course Chinese incomes are diverging rapidly but 
given that it started with very little inequalities, it remains one of the most egalitarian 
societies, which is best confirmed by the commodity pattern of its demand. (Morris, 
Sebastian 2005). 
 
Growth outside the zones, and spillover benefits outside the zones especially in terms of 
learning to work with high technology and modern designs, and with modes of contracts 
(Original Equipment Manufacture (OEM), International Subcontracting (IS), Contract 
Processing etc). These  have been crucial as the organisational and contractual basis for 
the high growth and transformation of the Chinese economy.  
 
The FDI that went from HK and Macao to the Pearl River Delta has been quite unlike 
FDI as observed elsewhere. Sit and Yang (1997) observe that this FDI was export 
oriented almost in its entirety. This is not surprising given the export led industrialisation 
policies that China was following quite like South Korea and Taiwan in and earlier 
period. Even in these countries much of the FDI (and more importantly non-FDI forms 
that led to OEM and IS relationships) was export oriented. The contrast with nearly all 
other LDCs (other than the ELG economies) where FDI was host country market serving 
(Latin America, South Asia) or resource extraction oriented (Latin America, Africa, 
Indonesia), is glaring but not surprising given the characteristics of ELG. Equally 
importantly they also observe that FDI at least in the Pearl Delta Area was directed to 
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smaller towns and cites rather than to the primate city which actually suffered a decline. 
Given the nature of the industry- labour value addition with much of the further up softer 
factors (trade, wholesaling, designs, marketing) being realised in HK and Macao this was 
not surprising, either.  
 
The efficient provision of infrastructure in the zones and the choice of the zones away 
from the main city (for political reasons of living up to the idea of two systems in one 
country) but closer to smaller cities with the trained manpower were additional factors 
were important in the unlimited expansion of the original zone. So also the controlled 
immigration into these areas, expansion possibilities within the zone and the extreme 
profitability of exports based on labour processing. If one views the relationship between 
HK and Macao and China as one of re-absorption into the Chinese economy, of these city 
states even as they re-establish their urban rank order in the hierarchy of central places, 
then there is no anomaly to the expectation that the bulk of FDI (generally assumed to be 
home market seeking) get quartered in and around  the  major cities of a nation especially 
its primate city. 
 
Box: Regional Determinants of FDI
11
 
“An interesting starting point is Stephen Hymer’s (1971) understanding of the location of 
activities within the globally present multinational corporation. Hymer following the 
early business strategy approach classified decision making into three kinds: operational, 
managerial and strategic. This classification has now become standard in the study of 
organisations and their strategy/ structure/ decision making. Strategic decisions where 
much discretion and value arises are housed in the head quarters (HQ) of the firm which 
for various organisational and economic reasons (span of control, availability of a wide 
variety of services locally, the possibility of being in close communication with other 
managerial hierarchies, the lower costs of a central place to direct and manage 
businesses from) tends to get located in the primate city of the source country. And source 
countries are those with primate cities in the global sense. (And the rise of MNCs in a 
particular country strongly catapults its primate city to a higher level in a global sense). 
While some of the administrative / managerial decisions could take place at the 
subsidiary level, they locate in the second order cities of the world which include the 
leading primate cities of the non-industrialised countries. The operational decisions 
covering the day to day aspect of production could be located in many more central 
places, and therefore could be more widespread in a spatial sense. Thus an important 
insight which was crucial to  regional scientists – the hierarchy of central places, and the 
varying central place needs of various industries /activities, can be exploited to 
understand the regional choices of FDI firms or MNCs. The HQ functions of the  MNCs 
having the highest need, and MNCs activities in other countries competing with the 
national firms of host countries for locating their offices for strategic decision making, 
would tend to successfully locate close to the most important cities. In other words 
MNCs’ need for central places is even larger than that of non-MNC firms, ceterius 
paribus.  This is easily related to the ‘intangible asset’ theory of MNC or the ‘advantage 
theory’ (Kindleberger, 1969) which conceptualises that MNCs need to have an advantage 
(ownership) that is not easily traded in the market, so that they need to internalise the 
same to exploit their ownership advantages globally and they do so in countries with the 
                                                 
 
 
11 From Morris, S. (2004). 
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best locational factors. This is the ownership, location, internalisation (OLI) framework, 
which is the mainstream conceptualisation of FDI/ MNCs. (Dunning, J., 1979)  
 
The Locational Choices of MNCs 
 
MNCs need to have a distinct advantage so that it can overcome the intrinsic 
disadvantage of operating at a distance in a country that is different from its home 
country. Focussing first on the additional cost to the MNC in operating in a foreign 
country, it is obvious that risks especially those that arise out of political changes and 
uncertainties in the law in business, threatening events like riots and revolutions, 
discretionary rules, and regulatory uncertainties when they are large become asymmetric 
as between MNCs and local firms. This in an intercountry context implies that MNCs 
could bypass countries with large risks in spite of possibly other good economic factors. 
In the intracountry context (especially in a large federally constituted nation) this means 
that regions that show adverse political and social characteristics would be severely 
punished by foreign direct investors.  
 
Lower order cities are more distant from foreign cities and home country primate central 
places on the aspect of living spaces, and availability of goods and services of a wide 
variety, as compared to the largest primate cities of the host developing country. Thus 
lower order cities would have a comparative disadvantage to house FDI vis-à-vis 
domestic investments, so that FDI would be far more concentrated in the highest order 
cities. 
 
MNCs operate at the national and international (as when they export) levels, and hardly 
ever at the regional levels.  This means that their need for central places and ability to 
afford the same is comparatively higher for them than for nationally limited and certainly 
regionally limited businesses of similar products and sizes. This larger comparative need 
is perhaps the biggest driver of MNCs towards the primate and most well served cities in 
an economy to locate their (host country) HQ and offices. And then locating the actual 
plant /producing offices etc would be conditional on this choice especially when the 
outputs planned are not constrained by dependence on geography (natural resources etc).  
In other words FDI would rank highest in the need for central places of all investments. 
The lowest ranking would be investments by small local firms and investments without 
scale and scope economies and with large costs of movement of good and services –
typically retailing, vegetable sales, repair services etc. If the actual production is not 
characterised by a need to be near a particular resource or near markets, then it would 
be concentrated in the outskirts of the city selected for HQ, or in nearby smaller towns. If 
on the other hand the investments need to be near particular resources, then that factor 
would dominate the locational choice and the MNC may make do with the highest order 
central city or the city with the best serving functions near the resource. When production 
needs to be closer to markets (e.g. retail chain stores, oil distribution, food chains), then 
the investments would be distributed across the country with the HQ being located in the 
primate /best city. In the special case  where the activities of skilled people constitute the 
bulk of the value added (software, R&D, biotechnology, IT, telecom and electronics 
equipment, precision machinery) besides central place functions, good living conditions 
and spaces- city serving functions- would predominate. And in all cases there would be 
additional bandwagon effects following from the agglomeration economies. These are 
very large in service industries of the IT and software type. 
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Intangible Assets and Central Place Requirements 
 
Now FDI presumably having a comparative advantage in intangible asset industries 
would tend to operate at national and international levels, in order to maximise the gain 
from intangible assets,  since there are no diseconomies to reputational assets such as 
brands, technology, skills and trade secrets. Indeed the very reason for 
transnationalisation of MNCs is to exploit the largest possible markets through 
internalisation (since markets for such intangible assets either don’t exist, or undervalue 
such assets). Thus given the prior transnationalisation of MNCs we would be almost 
never wrong in presuming that MNC in the host country starts with the intention of 
accessing the entire national market.
12” 
 
Technology based industries were deliberately promoted after the spectacular success of 
labour intensive manufacturing in the late 80s and early nineties in response to rising land 
costs and the declining comparative advantage of the coast vis-à-vis the interior which 
was beginning to be felt. Other fiscal incentives were also important to make the 
transition to the technology and skill intensive phase of growth. (Wei, Xie (2000)). 
 
Three Phases in the Development of Shenzen 
 
Three phases can be seen in the development of Shenzhen which is the locational 
expression of the macroeconomic patterns of China’s trade and inward foreign investment 
as its comparative advantage was allowed to unfold in  a dynamic way through ELG 
policies.  The original objects of SEZs were attracting foreign capital, importing advanced 
technologies, employment of Chinese workers,  understanding management of capitalist 
enterprises. The employment of Chinese workers was the objective that was more than 
met and became a driver of success, since with the vast employment growth and the 
spending and transfer effects of the same, the country could look ward to demand as well 
as foreign exchange to step up the rate of investments. That the employment happened 
among the working class of no distinction and among women more than men also meant 
that the vehicle of the SEZs could only have become increasingly popular. The macro-
economic consistency in terms of the pursuit of the ELG of the Asian dragons was 
crucial. It is only now after much of the disguised labour has been absorbed that the 
aspect of high technology comes to the forefront. Similarly, the aspect of foreign 
investment was less foreign and more local. But the investments may have been more 
domestic than foreign. A Lewisian model where the quit rate wages from the non-
capitalist sector does not rise (or rises much slower than labour productivity) is at the core 
of the understanding of the rapid rise in savings and investments of  the Chinese 
economy. The vast investment in public services and little or no unionisation meant that 
the real wages would rise only once all disguised unemployment is over. Use of migrant 
rather than local labour was crucial to the large rise in the savings and surpluses of the 
relocated labour intensive industries. And the demand side was taken care of by the 
undervalued currency and the slew of measures that favoured tradable goods production, 
import substitution and export promotion. 
 
                                                 
 
 
12 This may not be true for MNCs from small countries in an enormously large market like the US, where 
MNC firms may chose a niche strategy. But there are very few cases where the niche strategy would 
translate into a local market strategy. More typically it would mean a niche product or service for the 
national market as a whole. 
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Unlike what is generally believed the regional inequality in China in income and growth 
are not very large and indeed strong convergence has taken place both within regions and 
across regions with some significant exceptions. Anhui Province witnessed  stagnation in 
per capita income due to natural calamities.  (Zhang and Kristensen, 2001). More 
importantly the inequality of foreign direct investment both within and across regions is 
considerable but that has not led to rising inequality of incomes. This is because 
Keynesian demand multiplier effects which have been large for the poorer areas have 
been at work in various ways acting through the demand side effects of the rise in income 
and spending in the FDI rich areas. (Zhang, Jie  and Gustav Kristensen (2001)). 
 
In 2000 the idea was “Western Development “ , i.e. to bring the interior of China into the 
development. Equally importantly the activities within the zones had themselves 
diversified as Chinese exports have diversified into technology based exports from 
manufacture of simple labour intensive goods, assembly etc. As imports of goods of high 
tech, and capital goods took place their import substitution also began in some of these 
zones. Indeed the state is today focused on pushing the zones and areas around  zones 
higher up the value added chain  and onto high skill labour using activities to serve both 
exports and import substitution. This is as to be expected since the disguised 
unemployment may have been completely overcome by the mid-nineties when the labour 
shortages emerged and the need to take industry to the interior became obvious. Labour 
rates also began to rise steeply in the East making vanilla semi-skilled labour  absorption 
no longer as highly profitable as they used to be in the first half of the eighties. Today the 
state in engaged in promoting various high tech parks close to large cities and to 
population centres, including in some of the earlier highly successful manufacturing 
zones. These too have registered much success since in many other ways and especially 
structurally the Chinese economy having entered the middle income group is at the 
beginning of the expected rapid growth of high tech and differentiated goods industries.  
The deeper import substitution of the Chinese economy and its large size would permit 
such growth into a wide variety of industries and services. In this respect China today is 
where Korea was in the early to mid-eighties.  
 
Not many Chinese firms were headquartered in Shanghai. But over the late nineties 
Shanghai has emerged as the preferred location of foreign (truly foreign) firms in the 
Chinese economy. The vast investments in the city serving functions by the Chinese and 
municipal governments, besides the development of the various levels of zones have been 
instrumental in this transformation. Being also close to the centre of gravity of the 
Chinese population, and having excellent links with other centres of population besides 
export oriented manufacturing, manufacturing for import substitution by computer and 
electronic firms, precision engineering, high technology firms, automobile, electronic, 
telephone equipment,  etc have taken root in Shanghai. A critical level of foreign 
(expatriate population) has allowed the city to be comfortable for foreigners especially the 
Japanese. 
 
Shanghai- Recapturing Primate Status 
 
he growth of the Zones in and around Shanghai, their large FDI inflows and the support 
to Shanghai from the central government, and its miraculously rapid transformation must 
also be seen as the re-establishment of the hierarchy of central places with Shanghai in 
the lead of the entire hinterland of the city, and perhaps the most important gateway city 
of the country.  As China opened up the reassertion of Shanghai was inevitable and the 
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setting up of zones in and around Shanghai, and actions of the Chinese government must 
be seen as consciously or unconsciously (more likely) having led to an orderly un-
foldment of the same. Thus Shanghai has  quickly established its hierarchy and today the 
entire region including the subservient cities have been closely linked and coordinated 
especially in terms of road and rail links to make the hinterland access of Shanghai and its 
links with other cities very easy. Shanghai commands a hinterland that is one of the 
largest in world in both area and population since along the eastern board it extends up to 
Beijing and into the lower valley of the Hwang-ho, and along the Yangtze right up to 
Chengdu (China large city in the interior). (Wei, Yehua Dennis and Chi Kin Leung 
(2005)). The choice of Shanghai as China’s primate city in the new world of globalisation 
was a recognition of its obvious geographical advantages and of policies and investments 
to take advantage of the same. Thus the infrastructural development along the Yangtze to 
make the river navigable almost 3000 km into the interior,  the area and development 
approaches around the principal arteries linking the city to other cites in the heartland of 
China, the vast investments in city forming functions, the opening up of zones and areas 
within and outside the city for FDI and industrial location, besides the macroeconomic 
drivers of ELG must be seen together. To make a contrast, it is akin to imagining that 
there is acute recognition at the national level of Calcutta’s position as commanding a 
vast hinterland and therefore making coordinated investments to vastly improve its links 
with all the second order cities in the Ganges basin even as all fiscal administrative and 
other dysfunctional stoppers are removed to the development of the region. 
 
‘FDI’ into Shanghai 
 
While the tight control and regulation over FDI and especially its direction to the earlier 
designated Zones were important factors in Shanghai being left out in the early phase of 
the open door developments, the macro economic aspect of the early phase is less 
recognised or realised. The first effective phase of exports from China was based on 
leveraging the import repression though state owned  enterprises which had its limitation. 
In the second phase which overlapped the first the relocation of manufacturing from HK 
and Macao and its great expansion in the immediate hinterland of Macao and HK (the 
Pearl River Delta area) was the sine quo non of the early labour intensive phase of export 
led growth. Nearness to HK and Macao and the close links of the foreign investors 
(Chinese) based in the very same city states, were crucial.  In later phases of ELG “true” 
non-Chinese foreign investment from Korea, Japan and the US emerged, but Chinese 
investments have always dominated accounting for as much as 80% of FDI. Indeed round 
tripping of China's own investments may have been the bigger part of this 80%. Thus 
until recently while in the Pearl River Delta areas the role of HK was predominant by the 
late 90s the role of non- Hong Kong sources was more important in Shanghai. There was 
very little FDI into Shanghai in the eighties. FDI into Shanghai starts with the promotion 
of the Pudong industrial zone of Shanghai, and the extension of all concessions,  large 
state and central investments into the city and the city being seen as a vehicle for the 
continuation of the industrial transformation of China. FDI Not only from HK (which 
source was dominant in the early nineties) but from other countries followed.   
 
The Shanghai area attracted over US$ 32 billion over the nineties much of it from 1994 
onwards. Of these cumulative investments as much as 58% came from non HK sources, 
which was very different from the early phase of FDI in China and from the experience of 
the Pearl River Delta Areas. In 2002 the source distribution was as follows: HK (24.3 %) 
with Japan, US, Taiwan, Singapore, UK and Germany  contributing as  much as 63%. 
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Many of these investments took the form of wholly owned or majority owned foreign 
enterprises, and  a larger proportion of these rather than of the HK sources were directed 
at serving the home market and possibly also of export of components of differentiated 
and capital and technology  intensive goods, given  the continues adherence to ELG 
polices in the nineties. (Wei, Yehua Dennis and Chi Kin Leung (2005)). 
 
FDI and Technology Imports 
 
Japanese FDI was perhaps the last to respond to the open-door policy of China, given the 
history of Sino-Japanese relationship. This is despite the high expected affinity given the 
small distance, the complementarities of the two economies and especially of their 
businesses the influence of Japan and especially of its FDI was of great importance to 
China in the un-foldment of its dynamic comparative advantage. The institution of the 
SEZs and OCCs were particularly comforting to Japanese FDI. Korean and Taiwanese 
investments as also investments from US and European countries were somewhat late in 
responding. SEZs and OCCs were initially  important in the late eighties and the first 
phase of the boom over the nineties. As the boom in FDI from Japan took place the FDI 
was more generally directed as the country itself changed and the openness of China was 
extended beyond the SEZs. Japanese investments was of two types – one which was 
dependent on cheaper labour (though to a far less extent than FDI from Hong Kong) 
where the comparative advantage of the SEZs were still large. The more important 
technology based and skill based investments were more generally directed. Zhou, 
Changhui; Andrew Delios And  Jing Yu Yang (2001).  Trading investments by the 
Shogao-shosas were almost exclusively directed to the largest cities  and higher order 
central places. The size of the local market in the immediate environs of the city /place 
attracting FDI were of no consequence, pointing to the strong ELG aspect of the Chinese 
economy and the export and import substitution (working on the home market at a 
national level) that were its two components having been the determinant of Japanese 
FDI. Rail connectivity, infrastructure in general and access to central place functions were 
important determinants.  
 
  Page No. 24  W.P.  No.  2007-09-02 
   IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
SECTION 5: 




The case of Philippines is interesting. Available evidence indicates that this early pioneer 
of special economic zones for export promotion after early head start did not do well at 
all.  Early in 1972 after the collapse of the economic boom of the fifties and the early 
sixties, the government under Martial Law set up the Bataan Export Processing Zone on 
virgin territory at the southern tip of Luzon in 1972. Much expenditure was incurred by 
the government to build the zone and its infrastructure. Almost all the labour and 
manpower used came from the rest of the country.  Since the government combined the 
objective of (regional) development with that of exports the high cost of infrastructure in 
creating this zone is only to be expected and cannot be an argument against the idea of 
EPZs per se. In about 6 years the zone grew with more than 19,000 direct employment in 
the zone by  1977.  
 
The principal industries were as is to be expected textiles, garments, shoes and other 
processing industries including some electronic assembly.  The principal attractiveness 
arose out of the ease of working with the simpler administrative machinery within the 
zone, besides the duty concessions usual to export zones. Wage costs were apparently 
somewhat higher in the zone than elsewhere in Philippines since in the zone apparently 
labour laws were being implemented while elsewhere they could be readily violated. 
(Warr, Peter G. (c.1987)). Yet expansion did not go much beyond the initial phase of 
expansion.  Unlike Korea and Taiwan, the Philippine industrialisation cannot be called 
ELG. (Datta-Chaudhuri, M. (1981)). It was more laissez faire with a modicum of import 
substitution, and as such the ready availability of new industries for exports as the earlier 
more labour intensive stages got spent was not there. Moreover being near laissez faire 
the export profitability could not have been higher than domestic sale profitability. 
Lacking therefore an export pressure the results are not surprising. The other interesting 
aspects such as the sourcing of  as much as 70% of the capital used in the zone from the 
domestic market and institutions even by FDI firms in the zone can be reconciled with the 
fact that the government had artificially lowered the cost of capital for preferred 
industries by control over finance. This feature which is common to many countries 
including some of the ELG countries, could have been functional in resulting in 
heightened exports had the policy been ELG rather than merely liberal  with weak import 
substitution. Since growth of exports with a base in the zone (or for that matter in the 
Philippines) was limited the high profitability of the investors including foreign investors 
did not result in reinvestments to expand greatly the operations but only to high 
dividends, or transfer prices between parent and affiliates to be fixed in a way as to 
remove the surpluses out of the economy. The overall capital flight from the Philippine 
economy has been large being closer to Latin American levels. The contrast with the East 
Asian on exports and growth is quite remarkable and the differences had been noted early 
by perceptive scholars.  (Datta-Chaudhuri, M, (1981)). The Philippines experience 
illustrates that using EPZs to take advantage of the static comparative advantage of low 
cost labour are modest and self limiting unless accompanied by overall macroeconomic 
and industrial polices  that make for the unfoldment of dynamic comparative advantage. 
 
Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka too promoted export processing zones in the eighties. The performance of these 
zones has been far more significant for the Sri Lankan economy, than was the case of 
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zones for the Indian economy, before the internal civil war destroyed or greatly arrested 
their potential during the nineties.  Even at the peak in late eighties the success can be 
considered modest at best  and there is really no comparison with any of the successful 
East Asian cases. Textiles and clothing dominated, and the activities were no doubt 
helped by the MFA which made many low end garment and textile producers from East 
Asia and India shift to Sri Lanka to exploit that country’s unused quotas. Despite the 
returns being high in these zones, the return earned by domestic partners in JVs were high 
significant the expansion of activities in these zones was modest. (Jayanthakumaran, K. 
and John Weiss (1997)). Sri Lanka’s economic policies were not ELG. Nor was import 
substitution consistently pursued, and the modest performance of its zones and their lack 
of diversification are therefore understood. 
 
Eastern Europe and Russia 
 
Many Eastern European countries including Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
have attempted to follow China by imitating the SEZ idea. In Russia the objectives were 
many and these were highlighted in the debate to win political support for reform. And 
much discussion followed in both countries. But the results were quite different. In China 
while the economic aspects especially the export linkage overrode everything else, in 
Russia the SEZ idea became an important vehicle for usurping power away from the 
centre and to the local and state levels. Republicans and local governments particularly 
saw this as an instrument to wrest power from the Centre. Very quickly the motions were 
gone through and vast areas were declared as FEZs There are FEZs in 11 Regions   
covering over 1m sq kms (about 7% of the area of Russia)!  But performance has been no 
better than in other non FEZ areas. While the fact that over much of the 90s Russia was in 
turmoil is an explanation for the poor performance of the Russian economy and its FEZs, 
the neglect of the economic, organisational, financial and legal aspects of carrying out 
business in the FEZs were also important and as Russia has begum to return to normalcy 
this neglect now clearly stands in the way of the development of the zones.  SEZs were 
also compatible with the “shock-therapy” approach of Russia’s reform.  (Manezhev, S.A. 
(1995)). 
 
Perhaps the lack of anything like a coherent ELG of China is most notable. In Russia’s 
case, given its near complete industrialisation under the Soviet system, the equivalent of 
ELG would have been the export of the articles and services based on the use of its highly 
skilled and educated labour from its territory besides products of nature rather than 
frittering away that advantage by exporting away such manpower to Europe and the US 
as has been happening. That would have required coordinated efforts in such areas as 
defence industries, electronics, metallurgy, avionics,  computers and software and many 
high tech industries which were Russia’s particular advantages. The aspect of learning 
management, designing organisations, creating incentive compatible ways of working in 
groups, financing and marketing were even more important in the case of Russia. This 
would have made the role of FDI into zones could have been crucial, if the effort had 
been concentrated in to a  few zones under an overarching macroeconomic policy that 
was favourable to industrial location in Russia.  The macroeconomics was as adverse as 
could be imagined. Capital flight under the confusion of the shock therapy approach 
reached more than 8% of GDP and remained at these levels for well over a decade. 
Indeed no orderly movement to markets was possible and the economy even now awaits 
the rule of law (especially in economic transactions) to emerge not just by the exercise of 
state power but by the power of mafias and robber barons as they begin to recognise the 
value of (and require) contractual rules for the conduct of business. 
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In Eastern Europe on the other hand the function of linkage with Western Europe   
dominated the SEZs as much as the changing economic structure and performance of the 
economy. This happened on the accommodation of these countries either directly into the 
EU or through arrangements that improved market access. More than the special zones 
the entire economy was so turned around to the great economic benefit of the region. FDI 
into countries like Hungary was almost entirely dominated by industrial revival linked to 
the establishment of trade links and hence inter alia the export of manufactures to 




This paper has argued that the role the SEZs and more generally special zones play have 
varied widely  depending upon the strategies of growth their hosting countries have 
followed and the special trade relationships they have with other countries. The roles have 
also varied over time depending upon the trade strategy and more generally the growth 
strategies pursued by the countries, especially when these are not already  industrialised. 
It is useful to distinguish between laissez-faire, import-substitution and export led growth 
as distinct types of industrialisations to understand not only trade and investment and 
growth but also the roles and success of SEZs across a wide variety of countries and over 
time in the second half of the twentieth century.  
 
Special economic zones following the enormous success of China have been widely 
imitated. But it is to be entirely anticipated  that the results would vary greatly.  Earlier 
avatars of SEZs in the form of Foreign Trade Zones (FTZs) and Export Promotion Zones 
(EPZs) were important in the export led growth of East Asia especially South Korea. But 
more than SEZs or EPZs per se it is the pursuit of “export led growth policies” which 
underlie the success of exporting and hence of SEZs. SEZz/EPZs can be seen as a (not 
necessary) microeconomic and spatial initiative in the  pursuit of ELG under rather 
special circumstances by China, and South Korea and  Taiwan to more limited extent in 
their early phases of transformation. In other countries not pursuing ELG  success of 
SEZs/EPZs has been rather modest. The roles played by the SEZs/ EPZs etc whatever 
their original purpose were constrained and determined by the macroeconomic policies, 
trade policies, and regional alignments. There is little meaning in studying SEZs beyond 
their layout and design without reference to these broader trade and macroeconomic 
policies. Thus early pioneers line India could make little out of their EPZs since the 
policies severely biased against exports. We characterise export led growth (ELG) as the 
strategy that has allowed the late twentieth century industrialisations, which is far from 
both import substitution (as conventionally understood) and laissez faire, and to be the 
simultaneous pursuit of both IS and EP. With this framework we are able to understand 
the role and evolution of SEZs in a wide variety of countries. These help us to explain and 
anticipate that unless the policy turns sharply to favours exports (more correctly tradables 
over non tradables) the success of Indian SEZs would be modest and nowhere near that 
registered in China. Following from our characterisation of Import Substitution, Export 
Led Growth and Laissez Faire we also bring out the nature and performance of “special 
zones” when these are promoted under the very same regimes. 
 
The more analytical conclusions outlining the role and performance of SEZs were 
gathered together in table 4.  
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Table 1:  Salient Features of Economic Strategies Attempting to Bring About the Economic 
Transformation 
Aspect of growth 
and development 
Export Led Growth  Import Substitution  Laissez Faire 
Overall 
characterisation 
Simultaneous promotion of 
exports and importables. 
Px/Pnt , Pm/Pnt  much greater 
than otherwise trough Import-
Substitution and Export 
Promotion being 
simultaneously pursued. 
Px/Pm could well be at border 
ratios deceiving most 
economists (including WB) 
into characterising ELG as 
laissez-faire (or the movement 
to laissez faire) . Trade ratio 
rises much faster than world 
average. 
“Classical” import 
substitution of the Lisztian 
variety. Import goods 
production is encouraged. 
Exports typically suffer. 
Trade ratio typically falls 
with this strategy. Pm/Px > the 
border prices, creating 
positive incentives for IS and 
negative for exports goods 
production. Trade ratio in a 
sense relative to the world 
falls. 
Pm/Px = border 






Exchange rates  The effective exchange rate 
would be highly undervalued  
The effective exchange rate is 
typically overvalued 
The effective 
exchange rate is 
usually at 
“equilibrium”.  
Tariffs  Tariffs could be large but need 
not be. Typical pattern is of 
high tariffs for IS industries 
which then are reduced as 
they mature to become export 
industries. With time no tariff 
protection is required. 
Tariffs on protected IS 
industries are large and 
overall level of tariffs could 
be high. Effective protection 
could vary widely.  




Builds on the unfoldment of 
dynamic comparative 
advantage. Yesterday’s IS 
industries become today’ s 
export industries 
Creates new industries but 
the syndrome of dependence 
on protection is high. Exports 
are usually limited to natural 
resources and to products and 




Competitive factors  ELG being based on exports 
exposes its actors to the 
discipline of the global market 
to put enormous pressure to be 
efficient and market 
responsive. 
Protection is high so 
competitive factors are 
underdeveloped 
Only a slow 
change in 
competitive 




Natural resource (for a short 
period)- semiskilled and 
otherwise under/un employed 
labour – capital intensive 
standardised goods – skilled 
labour intensive goods – 
differentiated goods in a 
evolutionary fashion. 
Comparative advantage 
artificially suppressed. Only 




evolving and the 
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labour.   IIMA  y  INDIA 
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Terms of trade  Fall rapidly as these countries 
penetrate the markets of the 
advanced countries. This 
happens for quite a while until 
the stage of differentiated 
goods in reached. Yet the 
volume expansion is so large 
that the country gains. 
Destination countries also 
gain enormously and so the 
strategy is politically also 
feasible. ELG countries are 
able to suffer a terms of trade 
decline since they are able to 
use idle /under utilised labour. 
Once DU is over the gross 
labour productivity rises 
(VA/L) rapidly enough to be 
larger than the terms of trade 
decline, so that there is all 
round gain. 
May fall or rise – no 
unambiguous trajectory is 
expected. Driven by the 
idiosyncratic composition of 
the trade basket. But terms of 
trade could be affected by the 
relative price fall of labour 
intensive and other 
manufacaturers taking place 















Generally high – above 30% 
of GDP on a sustainable basis 
Moderate with a range from 
20% to 30% (India) 
Low typically 
below 20% of 
GDP unless there 
are special factors. 
Equality of income 
distribution 
Growth is equality (especially 
when measured in terms of 
consumption) promoting since 
much of the additional value 
added is either invested or 
earned by new workers. This 
is more so in the early phase 
when disguised 
unemployment is being 
overcome. In the latter phase 
of differentiated goods 
industries there could be some 
divergence 
Growth can be highly 
iniquitous  since large rents 
and spending out of the rents 
arise in IS and idiosyncratic 
industries of natural 
advantage. 
Since structural 
change is hardly 
there, the changes 
in income 
distribution are 











Role of the state in 
investments 
Have varied with moderate to 
very high 
Have been moderate to high  Low 
State direction and 
control over 
resource allocation 
Generally high especially in 
the early phases  
High to moderate   Low 
Rates of growth 
possible to achieve 
Very high in the range of 7-
12% per annum on a sustained 
basis for as long as 15-20 
years to take the economy 
through transition 
Moderate growth rates over 
the longer period typically 
less than 5% on an average at 
best (India in recent times) 
and sustainability is not 
guaranteed. No late 20
th 
century successes. High 
variability in growth rates 
possible. 
Low to moderate 
growth rates with 
high variability in 
rates. Unless 
special conditions 
– access to a 
continental market 
or customs union 
is limiting 
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Diversification of 
the economy that 
results 
Very high level of 
diversification possible that is 
also efficient 
Very high level of 
diversification particularly 
when there is the added push 
to heavy and capital goods 
sectors (India 1955-65; and 
China 1965-70) ; but many 
sectors are underscaled and 
inefficient. 
Not much change 
in the structure of 
the economy. A 





Can happen in a short period 
of 10 years. 
Is usually left incomplete 
before the transition to laissez 
faire takes place 
DU can only 
continue; unless 
the economy on 
specific 
favourable factors. 
Factor productivity  The factor productivity is 
likely to be large given the 
quick unfoldment of learning 
curves, scale and scope 
factors. But as share of the 
total output growth the factor 
productivity is likely to be 
small, since much of the 
growth is expected from 
absorption of labour as the 
capital stock in the economy 
increases. The period of early 
growth with constant real 
wages, high rates of 
employment growth, constant 
(or marginally falling) capital 
intensity is most functional to 
the transformation process. 
Demand side limitations and 
small market sizes and the 
attendant dependence on 
tariff protection  (especially 
to start with) limit the total 
factor productivity to small 
levels. Even then the share of 
TFP could be similar or 
sometimes even better 
especially if the enclaved 
sector does not absorb labour. 
This is dysfunctional. In IS 
economies that were also 
inward looking (India 1955 to 
1992, and China over the 
GLF and CR periods) many 
industries would have also 
shown negative value 
addition if the inputs had 
been correctly accounted for.  
Factor 
productivity 
changes are likely 
to dominate while 
there is little 
impact on the 
absorption of idle 
labour unless there 
are special 
favourable factors. 
Role of foreign 
savings 
Conceptually this strategy 
does not require any foreign 
savings. But in the initial 
period some of the ELG 
economies (Taiwan, South 
Korea) do show major 
dependence on foreign 
savings which is overcome 
over an eight year period. 
Typically high rates of 
investment are matched by 
high rates of domestic savings 
and some like China have 
even been net capital 
exporters as they undergo 
their transformation at rapid 
rates. 
Foreign savings become 
necessary since the capital 
intensity can be expected to 
rise as IS is pushed deep 
down. Even if potentially the 
domestic savings are large 
they may not be realisable as 
overvaluation of the 
exchange rates usually result 
in significant deficits in the 
current account. “Excess” 
domestic savings are then 
“exported” out through 
various ways including 
capital flight and capital 
exports (especially when 
these economies are also 
open on the capital account –
Many of the Latin American 
economies for example). 
Foreign savings 




which on  a 
sustained basis is 
not large since 
there is little 
structural change 
taking place in the 
economy. For the 
more developed 
LF economies 
foreign savings are 
negative i.e. there 
is significant 
export of capital. 
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Large inflows possible which 
are nevertheless small in 
relation to domestic 
investments. Wide variation in 
the openness to FDI, yet FDI 
(city states excepted) have not 
been large relative to capital 
formation 
Moderate inflows possible 
which can be large in relation 
to domestic investments. FDI 
regimes have ranged form the 
very liberal (Latin America) 
to the most ill-liberal (India 
before 1991) 
Typically liberal 
to FDI. FDI 
dominance is 
large.  
Nature of Non – 
Resource seeking 
FDI 
Much of it is directed to 
production for the export 
market 
There very little FDI directed 
at the export market nearly all 
of it is directed at a protected 
(or shielded) home market. 
Non-tradables would attract 
FDI. 
FDI is in many 
sectors including 
what would be 
non-tradables. 




Of much importance in the 
exports of mfg, through 
arrangements such as OEM, 
and international 
subcontracting. Can be very 
high especially in those 
economies where FDI is 
restricted (South Korea, 
Taiwan, Japan and China). 
Buying by retail and 
wholesale chain stores also of 
importance. So also the role of 
trading houses. 
Of little importance since 
much of the transnational 
corporation interest is in 
serving the domestic market. 
Trading houses have some 
role especially in the little 
exports and in the imports of 
machinery and materials. 
Little scope for 
non-arms length 
arrangements. 
Buying by large 
retail chain stores 
is the only non-
equity form. 
Limited role for 
trading houses. 
Role of FDI  The principal contribution of 
FDI is in terms of the positive 
externalities –learning by 
imitation, spillovers of 
technology and work 
practices, access to marketing 
and technology etc. The role 
of FDI as a contributor to 
savings is less important 
especially in the latter stages. 
Even China is not an 
exception if one recognises 
that 80% or more of FDI into 
China is mere round tripping 
or arising out of the cross-
county  investment links of 
the Chinese bourgeoisie. FDI 
is therefore almost completely 
complimentary to domestic 
capital 
FDI is often displaces 
domestic savings and 
investments since the 
macroeconomic policies 
result in asymmetry between 
the cost of capital in the 
domestic economy which is 
higher than in the cost of 
capital in source countries.  
When so, FDI can be 
dysfunctional and result in 
take over of domestic assets.  
The spillover effects are still 
significant but much smaller 
than in the case of ELG. FDI 
tends to displace domestic 
capital and can when not 
restricted lead to ‘de-
nationalisation” of domestic 
business; i.e. substitutes 
Spillovers are 
small and FDI’s 
role is dictated by 
industrial 
economic 
considerations in a 
laissez faire 
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Table 2 Salient Features of Special Economic Zones Under Various Transformation Strategies 
Aspect of  
Special/ Free 
Economic Zone  
Export Led Growth 
Economies 
Import Substitution  Laissez Faire 
Share of zones in 
overall investment 
Can vary widely depending 
upon the strategy pursued. 
But in the early stages the 
share of special zones can be 
significant. Thus SK and 
Taiwan had small significant 
shares but China had vary 
large share of investment (c. 
5% or more) going into the 
zones. The principal 
determinants besides the 
fiscal and the infrastructural 
is the large bias in favour of 
exports. 
Very little almost negligible 
shares of investment go into 
special zones, since their 
logic when the overall policy 
is biased against exports is in 
opposition. (India, 
Bangladesh, Nepal, much of 
Latin America before the 
take off the regional trade 
agreements).  While the 
fiscal and the infrastructural 
factors when favourable can 
attract investments, these 
have to overcome the large 
bias against tradable goods 
(especially exports goods) 
production 
Zones when the only 
option can have small 
shares of investment. 
Cheap infrastructure 
or favourable location 
can drive investments 
into the area. The 






Is usually large (and much 
larger than the share of 
investment) in the early days 
when the functionality of 
ELG is to absorb the 
unemployed/ underemployed 
labour. In later stages as the 
economy as such modernises 
and the IS industries now 
become export industries the 
role of zones comes down. 
In China the role of zones 
has continued to be large 
since zones got defined to 
include cities and the 
surrounding areas in as 
ascendant manner as the rest 
of the economy developed 
and (re-)modernised under 
ELG.  
Very small share in 
employment usually. (Much 
of South Asia). In those 
economies with favourable 
trade arrangements like 
NAFTA, or regional trade 
arrangements, processing 
industries despite the bias 
against exports can take root 
to give significant 
employment of unskilled and 
semiskilled labour. 
{‘Maquiladora’ industries in 
Mexico for example}. But as 
the bias can increase due to 
uncorrected overvaluation of 
the exchange rates these are 
not steady employment.  
Could be significant 
when zones are 
defined to be large. 
Otherwise small share. 
Role of FDI in 
zones 
FDI can be the initial spurts 
for take off the zones, but is 
quickly followed by 
domestic investments. Since 
much of the FDI is labour 
seeking and since are 
promoted inter alia to absorb 
idle labour the role of FDI in 
zones tends to be larger than 
the role of FDI over the rest 
of the economy. This may be 
enhanced by policies that bar 
FDI outside the zones 
(China until the early 
nineties, Korea in the first 
phase of ELG). {the 
extremely large of ‘FDI’ in 
China into the zones is 
additionally on account of 
Whatever little FDI that is 
semi-skilled and skilled 
labour seeking is confined 
almost exclusively to the 
zones since investments here 
have the least bias against 
exports. Much of the FDI 
being internal market 
oriented has otherwise little 
role in zones especially those 
that are exporting. 
No expected 
difference between the 
zones and the rest of 
the economy other 
than that 
infrastructurally  and 
fiscally determined.  
 
  Page No. 36  W.P.  No.  2007-09-02 
   IIMA  y  INDIA 
Research and Publications 
about 80% of FDI being 
misclassified as such when it 
is in reality domestic 
surpluses exported to be 
reinvested through HK, and 
Taiwan front firms}  
Growth rate of 
output of zones. 
Can be very large matching 
or even exceeding the  
export growth rates 
especially in the early phase 
when the exports arise 
largely from the zones. As 
the rest of the economy 
catches up in exports, the 
overall growth rates of zones 
slow down to more normal 
levels (closer to the GDP 
growth rates). {The case of 
China where the zonal 
growth rates have continued 
to be large even larger than 
the export growth rates is 
because of the continuous 
administrative reworking of 
domestic areas as new zones. 
Particular zones though 
show the expected pattern of 
very high growth followed 
by moderate growth} 
Very small beyond an initial 
growth. Few zones are even 
occupied to capacity. Overall 
growth rate tends to be 
slower than GDP of all 
export /special zones put 
together. This is only to be 
expected since policies are 
biased against exports. Only 
in periods when world trade 
as whole grows much faster 
than world GDP can the 
zones in these areas be 
expected to grow somewhat 
faster than GDP. 





category the zones 
would grow at 
idiosyncratic rates 
deepening upon the 
structure of industries 
in the zone. 
Growth spill - 
overs from zones 
Very large, and countries 
have different strategies to 
capture the same. For S 
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, 
the spillovers were allowed 
to be captured by the rest of 
the economy as such, to 
makes the zones as such 
irrelevant with the passage 
of time. In the case of China, 
area extension and new 
zones (including declared 
rather than constructed 
zones) with links to the older 
zones and to urban 
agglomerations have 
allowed the capture of the 
positive spillovers in a 
directed spatial pattern that 
also had locational 
functionality. This was 
desirable given the large size 
of the Chinese economy 
(both in population and 
area).  
Very little direct spillovers 
from the zones. Some 
indirect (distantly 
attributable) spillovers from 
the absolute advantage 
industries in the zones 
possible (as in the case of 
software from the SEEPZ in 
India). 
Since there are no 
externalities expected 
anyway from 
economic activities in 
general, the little from 
special zones would 
not be significant. 
Instrumentalities 
of spillover 
Through the unfoldment of 
dynamic comparative 
advantage. As export 
industries create demands 
for IS industries these are 
forced to become 
Very weak spillover process. 
No sustainable dynamic 
process exits. When there are 
special trade and especially 
deeper integration links [East 
Europe reintegrating back 
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competitive as they now 
serve global markets. The 
growth impetus into the rest 
of the economy or into new 
special zones or into their 
extension is based on 
demand and so is 
autonomous and nor 
requiring close direction. 
The sustainability of the 
spillovers is also guaranteed. 
The nature of spillovers 
change with time. Initially it 
is in absorbing labour and in 
the spending effects of the 
labour’s income and in the 
vast surpluses which 
potentially raise the 
investment rates. Next it is 
in creating demands for now 
IS and to become export 
industries. Other spill-overs 
have been in terms of 
product quality, delivery 
schedules, managerial 
processes, and learning 
with Western Europe] the 
spillovers can be as very 
large and similar to those of 
ELG, except that no distinct 
phases need be observed. If 
the integrating country is 
also following ELG then the 
spillovers and the growth 
effects can be stupendously 
large [China vis-à-vis Hong 
Kong and Taiwan in the 
early phase of zone based 
exports and development]. 
Efficacy of fiscal 
incentives in 
zones 
Can be very high in the early 
phase when the fiscal 
concessions in the zones are 
an important way to direct 
the support to export 
activities.  But later the more 
important factor is the 
“effective relative 
undervaluation of the 
exchange rates” that works 
to keep the rate of increase 
in exports up. As such there 
is no continued dependence 
on the fiscal incentives 
Efficacy can vary but even if 
high declines since the 
“incentives” in the zone may 
merely go to partly 
overcome and neutralise the 
bias against exports and 
rarely to provide a positive 
thrust to exports in a 
sustained way. Dependence 
on fiscal incentives in an 
increasing way is usual with 
the continuation of IS. When 
IS changes towards LF the 
dependence can come down, 
but so would the continual 
production of new export 
industries that takes place in 
ELG. 
Scope and hence 
efficacy of the fiscal is 
limited. No 
dependence on fiscal 
incentives but then 





access to port and 
external links 
Crucial for export based 
zones which would be 
dominant. At mature states 
the continuation of the zonal 
approach (China since 1997) 
would mean that some zones 
in high-tech need could be in 
the interior and have more 
normal links with the 
external world. As the 
volume expands greatly the 
cost of transportation falls 
since the scale and scope 
factors are large in shipping. 
Necessary since the zones 
are explicitly promoted as 
export zones. But given the 
limited volumes the export 
reach the cost of transport 
does not decline due to scale 
factors in shipping. 
Transport factors are 
usually good to start 
with. When not on 
even otherwise the 
costs do not fall.  
Role and 
significance of 
Initially this is not 
significant, but as the 
Rarely would the 
agglomeration economies 
Agglomeration 
economies beyond the 
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activity level becomes very 
large the agglomeration 
economies emerge too 
dominate other factors 
especially the fiscal and 
concessional.  The 
agglomeration factors are 
initially horizontal but with 
the unfoldment of 
comparative advantage they 
could span the vertical too as 
the same zone is expanded 
and chosen for the new 
industries (Shenzen in 
China). 
emerge strongly enough to 
dominate over the fiscal and 
state provided. 
horizontal would not 
emerge as such since 
the development is 
based on static 
comparative 
advantage. 
Infrastructure  There is a need for 
infrastructure that is updated 
continually. Infrastructure 
cost per unit of exports or 
value added can only decline 
Initially provided 
infrastructure is often less 
than fully utilised, and the 
cost per unit can be high and 
non-declining 
In laissez faire the 
zones being little more 
than designated areas 
for activities, the costs 
and need for 
infrastructure need not 
go wrong. 
Social returns to 
investments in 
zones 
Very high especially of the 
proving initial zones 
 Modest  Low and sometimes 
the benefits may not 
even cover the cost of 
infrastructure 
especially if provided 
in new (remote) areas. 
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